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This study analyses the effect of the free cash flow, the dividend and the companies’ 
leverage on Earnings Management in Euro-zone countries, using a sample of around 
2.150 firm-year observations, from 2009 to 2016. I also analyze the 2008 financial crisis 
impacts on this study’s measures and, consequently, its relations to earnings management. 
The Kothari (2005)’s extension to Jones (1991) model is used to compute a discretionary 
accruals proxy, which is assumed as a measure of earnings management.  
This study documents evidence of a significant negative relationship between free cash 
flow and earnings management, while dividend and leverage correlates to earnings 
management positively, in terms of direction. Furthermore, in terms of amount, the 
relationship found is inverse to the previous: significant positive in regarding the free cash 
flow and negative for leverage and dividend paying firms. 
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Este estudo analisa o efeito do fluxo de caixa livre, do dividendo e do endividamento das 
empresas na Gestão de Resultados em países da Zona Euro, recorrendo a uma amostra de 
2.150 observações empresas-ano, de 2009 a 2016, com enfoque nos impactos sentidos 
nas variáveis de estudo durante a crise financeira de 2008, e consequentemente a sua 
relação com Gestão de Resultados. A extensão do modelo de Kothari (2005) ao modelo 
de Jones (1991) é usada para calcular, de forma aproximada, os accruals discricionários, 
que são assumidos como uma unidade de medida de gestão de resultados.  
Este estudo documenta evidências de uma relação negativa significativa entre o fluxo de 
caixa livre e a Gestão de resultados, enquanto as relações dos dividendos e alavancagem 
com a gestão de resultados são positivas, em termos de direção. Além do exposto, em 
termos de quantidade, a relação encontrada é inversa à anterior: significativa e positiva 
em relação ao fluxo de caixa livre e negativa em relação ao endividamento e aos 
dividendos. 
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Earnings management (EM) is a current problem that affects not only firms, but also the 
financial markets in which they are inserted. At corporate level, its consequences range 
from possible bankruptcy and violation of debt covenants, to investments in projects 
without profitability, which sole purpose is to benefit the managers at a personal level. At 
the market level, these may take the form of sanctions or fines imposed by regulators, an 
accentuated decrease of stock prices or even lead to a breach of confidence from investors. 
Given the great importance of the consequences mentioned, one question arises: why 
manage results? There is a panoply of motivations, but also of consequences. Watts and 
Zimmerman (1990) categorize incentives in capital market, contractual, regulatory and 
bonus contract incentives. Additionally, Dichev et al., (2013) in a survey to 169 CFOs, 
suggests that capital market motivations are the ones that are seen as the greatest influence 
while making decisions towards managing results. 
Over the years, several studies have sought a link between the earnings management and 
a number of key macroeconomic, microeconomic or accounting factor. This study, like 
others, focuses on the exploration of the hypothesis of connection between free cash flow 
(FCF), corporate indebtedness, and the payment of dividends and earnings management. 
The motivation behind the choice of these variables is based on the actions that are 
possible through each of them, as well as their next connections with each of the 
categories of motivations separately. In addition, the period under scope comprises the 
time lapse immediately after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, which 
caused a major shock in the global financial system and had a major impact on the 
financial markets. 
The effects of the 2008 financial crisis were large and were felt in the enterprise world, 
being documented in their accounting. This study, additionally to verifying the existence 
of a general link between the interest variables, and the management of earnings, it aims 
to search for a possible effect of the economic crisis on Earnings management (EM) 
through the management of accruals. 
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As mentioned, the sample covers a temporal universe of 8 years, between 2009 and 2016. 
It comprises around 2.150 listed companies from 15 Euro-Zone countries. The Kothari 
(2005) model was used to calculate discretionary accruals, and was adopted as a measure 
of earnings management.  
The results of the study suggest that the relationship between free cash flow and EM is 
negative regarding its direction, and positive in intensity. This suggests that companies 
with higher FCF practice EM with a sense of reducing earnings (Jensen, 1986; Kadioglu 
and Yilmaz, 2017), and practice more EM than companies with less FCF (Chung, Firth 
& Kim, 2005 and Lanhane and Mahakud, 2016). Contrasting, it also suggests that the 
relationship between dividends (DIV) and EM is positive in direction (Roychowdhury, 
2006 and Graham et al., 2005) and negative in intensity (Guizani, 2018 and Farinha and 
Moreira, 2007), suggesting that paying dividends increases the pressure over firms’ 
performance and, that the market scrutiny over firms mitigates some opportunities to 
enroll in EM. Similar to dividends, leverage findings indicate a positive connection 
between Leverage (LEV) and EM regarding its direction (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994 
and Chamberlain et al., 2014) and, a not statistically significant relation in terms of 
amount.  In addition, they generally suggest that the crisis led companies to practice more 
EM than usual, while its direction was not statistically significant.   
In this sense, this study is of interest to the academic community, because it suffices the 
need for a deepening in knowledge of the connection of three very relevant accounting 
variables, as well as more thorough look over issues related to the effects of economic 
crises on companies. This paper also makes it possible to alert the entities that regulate 
the financial markets for the need to create effective mechanisms aimed at relegating EM 
practices, reducing information asymmetry, and other measures such as strengthening 
existing regulations to increase the protection of financial markets investors. 
This study is divided into five sections. In the second section, we find the literature 
review, where a theoretical framework of EM is made, and several hypotheses are studied. 
In the third section, the sample is presented; the methodology, the EM measurement and 
the base model with the respective variables are explained. Section four discusses the 
results obtained and, finally, section five presents the conclusions that were taken based 
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on the results obtained, and identifies the limitations to the study, ending with some 
suggestions for future investigations. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Financial reporting suffers from a trade-off in reliability and relevance. The demand for 
financial information is spread through multiple types of users with multiple ends for its 
information. Debt-holders demand information regarding the liquidity and solvency of 
the firms, and the impact from current earnings on those measures, being its prime 
concern the reliability of the information. Current and potential shareholders’ principal 
concern is the firm’s ability to generate future cash flows, meaning that relevance is the 
key. Thus, the financial information is used by multiple stakeholders to take decisions, 
meaning that it must be accurate and timely relevant (Kothari, 2001).  
Accrual accounting allows firms to report about future revenues, expenses, and assets that 
do not translate immediately to cash, increasing the timeliness of the information through 
recognition of plausible future cash-flows. A more reliable information gives the 
investors a more complete view of firm’s owned assets.  
Additionally, the trade-off between reliability and relevance limits the use of accounting 
information, because of the managers’ use of judgment to exploit its discretion in personal 
or firms’ favor. 
Theoretically, the use of accruals would mean a greater quality of the accounting 
information, but the accounting system flexibility gives managers substantial influence 
over some subjective accounting recognition decisions, such as provisions, sales returns 
or other accounting methods, which would damage the quality of the accounting if its 
recognition do not truly reflect the firms’ current financial position. 
Therefore, the financial information disclosed can be intentionally manipulated by firm’s 
managers to mislead some stakeholders to achieve a certain objective. Accrual 
management is then, the intentional manipulation of accruals with resource to accounting 
flexibility by managers (Yan, 2006 and Aman et al., 2006). Thereafter, real activities 
management occurs “…when managers undertake actions that changes the timing or 
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structuring of operation, investment and/or financing transaction in effort to influence the 
output in the accounting system” (Gunny 2010, p.855).  
The previous literature does not reveal a single common definition for earnings 
management. According to Bjurman and Rahman (2014), earnings management (EM) is 
the umbrella term for different activities from managers towards influencing the 
accounting earnings’ number to reflect a desired outcome. According to Healy and 
Wahlen (1999), it occurs when managers’ use of judgment allows them to select reporting 
methods and estimates that do not truly reflect their firms’ underlying economics.  
Sun and Rath (2008, p.407) define EM as the “exercise judgement for the purpose of 
hiding true performance in order to either influence the stock performance, benefit from 
contractual terms between the firm and managers, or to influence regulatory decisions”.  
Fields et al., (2001), states EM as managers’ actions that can mislead the users of financial 
reporting data. An opportunistic approach can be observed in the fact that managers use 
the asymmetry of information to maximize their usefulness (Kundakchyan & Grigoryeva, 
2016).  
Although EM has been defined in so many ways, the main concept underlies on the 
purposeful change of financial reporting information by managers, to either mislead some 
stakeholders or to influence contractual outcomes.  
Multiple studies investigated the motivations that lead managers to manage earnings. 
Healy & Whalen (1999) and Watts and Zimmerman (1990) found that managers’ 
incentives to manage earnings could be categorized as capital market, contractual, 
regulatory and bonus contract incentives. Capital market motivations consist of the use 
of earning management to influence a stock price and to reduce cost of capital. In this 
case, managers have the incentive to inflate earnings to receive a higher valuation. Kothari 
(2015) found the evidence of overvaluation at the time of seasoned equity offerings 
among firms overstating earnings through real activities, and Cohen & Zarowin (2010) 
found that companies enroll in both types of earnings management prior to stock issuance.  
Contractual motivations concern contracts with different parties such as debt providers, 
suppliers, customers or other debtors and creditors. The fundamental idea behind this 
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motivation’s category is that managers have incentives to manage earnings to take 
advantage of its’ firm’s contractual counterparties. 
Regulatory incentives arise from the political and environmental risk associated with any 
business, and the potential harm that these factors may represent to said firms.  
Bonus contract refers to personal and purely opportunistic motives. The agency theory 
assumes the allowance of bonuses to point managers’ and shareholders’ interests at the 
same direction. These bonuses are usually connected to exceeding earnings benchmarks; 
thus, managers have motives to manipulate earnings towards increasing their personal 
welfare. 
 Additionally, Dichev et al., (2013) found that the desire to influence stock price, outside 
pressure to hit earnings benchmarks, and inside pressure to do the same, were the most 
popular answers from a survey vising a universe of 169 CFOs. Other studies focused on 
the detection of EM throughout different periods of time and different economic 
environments.  
2.1. Free cash flow and earnings management 
Earnings include plenty of non-cash components such as depreciation of tangible assets, 
amortization of intangibles, provision of bad debts and other accounting entries which 
could lead to a biased economic reality. Managers could manipulate earnings through 
several accounting discretionary options, whereas free cash flow is harder to manipulate 
(Akumu, 2014). 
Free cash flow (FCF) is a measure of how much cash a business generates after 
accounting for capital expenditures (Akumu, 2014). It can be defined as cash available 
for a resource provider, either from a debt or equity provider, meaning that it is the cash 
available after fulfilling the requirements of the business, which can be used to pay debt 
or to distribute to equity holders. Jensen (1986) defined free cash flow as the excess cash 
available to invest in all positive net present value projects and argued that managers use 
FCF for their personal gain tending to enroll in non-profitable projects.  
The non-optimal use of FCF could rise agency problems. The agency problem, developed 
by Coase (1937), Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Fama and Jensen (1983 a,b), 
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essentially consists on the separation of ownership and control of a firm. The conflict of 
interests between managers and shareholders has been studied widely, and it relies on the 
fact that managers have incentives to behave based on their personal interests instead of 
the firms’ and shareholders’ interests (Jensen, 1986). Adding to this, Kadioglu and 
Yilmaz (2017) posited that managers tend to make unnecessary expenditures that benefit 
themselves at the expense of shareholders’ interest. 
Recent studies found a positive connection between the surplus of free cash flow and 
agency problems, meaning that the higher the free cash flow excess, higher the agency 
problems (Chung, Firth & Kim, 2005 and Lanhane and Mahakud, 2016). This relationship 
is even deeper when investment opportunities are scarce (Gul, 2001). In the event of 
surplus of free cash flow, managers have the incentive to “waste” it on non-optional 
project such as zero or negative NPV projects to maximize their welfare at the expense 
of firms’ value.  
Separately from investment opportunities, the free cash flow could be managed by 
lengthening the time to pay the bills, by shorting the time to collect cash from firms’ 
debtors, by delaying inventory buy offs, or by choosing what items are or are not capital 
expenditures (Jensen & Michael, 1996). By acting in this way, managers can either inflate 
or deflate earnings to achieve a certain outcome that could be an overvaluation, or avoid 
debt-covenants violations. 
2.2. Dividend and earnings management 
Firms managers can decide how to distribute its’ earnings to investors. The most common 
ways to do it are the distribution of a dividend per share or shares’ buy back. Dividend is 
the distribution of profits to a company’s’ shareholder, while shares repurchases represent 
the firms’ intention to buy its’ own shares with a premium, granting to the investor a 
certain return and increasing the firms’ control. Investors are assumed to be rational and 
risk averse, and are expected to act in disregard to the firms’ policy, which is preferred 
by the markets to be solid and constant instead of volatile.  
Lintner (1956) argues that managers believe that the markets prefer firms with stable 
dividend policies. Contrarily to Lintner findings, Miller and Modigliani (1961) argued 
that in perfect and complete markets, the firms’ dividend policy does not affect its’ value, 
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positing that the firms’ value is determined by the optimal choice of investments and that 
the net payout is the difference between earnings and investments, concluding that a firm 
can adjust its dividends to any level, changing the number of shares outstanding.  
Further, Jensen (1986) theorizes that dividend distribution is an effective tool in terms of 
constraining management self-interest actions, due to its dispersing of FCF ability. Thus, 
dividends can be used as an internal corporate governance mechanism, reducing the 
agency problems (Guizani, 2018). Although dividend proprieties allow its use as an 
agency problem mitigator, it can work as an enhancer, pressuring the management to 
either achieve certain goals (Graham et al., 2005) or to maintain dividend amounts, when 
it’s not achievable (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
The dividend policy has a great impact on stock price. Lintner (1956) introduced the 
concept of conservatism on dividends, meaning that a structured and solid dividend policy 
conveys good information about the firm to the market, while a volatile dividend policy 
would mean surprises to shareholders, which might result on a stock price decrease. 
Consequently, the signaling effect of the dividend policy could prevent managers to make 
downward adjustments or give them the incentive to make upward adjustments to the 
earnings distribution (Allen and Michaely, 2003), being simultaneously a mitigator and 
an enhancer of EM. 
Brav et al. (2005, p.520) found that “firms with stable and sustainable increases in 
earnings are for the most part the only firms that consider increasing or initiating 
dividends.”, reinforcing the signaling effect of dividend policy. 
Recent literature indicates that dividends are “disappearing” (Fama and French, 2001a). 
Dividend payout strategies are gradually being replaced by stock repurchases. Firms’ 
prefer mixed policies over dividend only strategies, Skinner (2008).  Allen and Michaely 
(2003) argue that both strategies have similar signaling effects but repurchases are larger 
in size and their impact is more pronounced.  
2.3. Leverage and earnings management 
Leverage consists in a level of commitment, for a firm, to use its free cash flows to pay 
the principal plus interests to some counterparty. According to Jensen (1986) this 
relationship between debt and cash flows works as a mitigator of earnings managements, 
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reducing the cash available on managers’ power, which could be invested 
opportunistically in non-value maximizing projects. Nevertheless, its ability to reduce 
agency costs through free cash flows can originate a problem of divergence of interest 
between shareholders and bondholders, or between managers and bondholders. This new 
problem generates agency costs, meaning that managers can either increase firm’s “risk” 
investing in highly profitable and risky projects, maximizing value for shareholders, or 
changing its payout policy in the bondholder’s favor, harming the shareholders. 
To reduce this conflict and align the stakeholders’ interest, debt providers and firms sign 
contracts, whereas its violation would imply major changes on firms’ debt in less 
favorable terms. These covenants are usually connected with accounting figures, earnings 
benchmarks or profitability thresholds. Since its violation could harm the firms and its 
managers, an opportunistic setting is revealed, since managers can manipulate earnings 
to avoid debt covenant violations.   
Furthermore, managers may feel the importance of managing the leverage levels when 
their companies wish to take a new loan, as that lenders are rational and risk averse, and 
the company’s current level of leverage could dictate the approval of the loan (Zamri et 
al., 2013). The literature offers mixed results on whether managers manipulate earnings 
by leverage-based purposes. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Chamberlain et al. (2014) 
found a positive connection between leverage and earnings management when firms 
intend to reduce the likelihood of debt covenants violations or intend to increase their 
bargaining power during debt renegotiations. On the other hand, some studies found a 
negative link between earnings management and leverage, arguing primarily that leverage 
requires a debt repayment reducing the amount of cash on managerial hands and secondly 
that levered firms may face a greater control from creditors, making it harder to 
manipulate earnings (Jensen, 1986; Rodriguez-Pérez and Van Hemman, 2010; Afza and 
Rashid, 2014; Jelinek, 2007). 
Firms can raise debt through private (banks) or public debt markets (bondholders). 
Raising debt leads to an accounting scrutiny conducted by lenders to access the firms’ 
solvency and liquidity. The quality of accounting information plays an important role 
when lenders estimate future cash flows, meaning that information risk is price 
incremental to the borrowers’ default risk (Bharath, Sunder, and Sunder, 2008). Although 
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accrual-based EM is not easy to spot in accounting panel data, if borrowers pay a price 
for the quality of their accounting information within debt total price, we can assume that 
EM activities may increase the information risk and consequently the debt price.  
 
3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
In the beginning of the XXI century, the world lived what many economists consider to 
be the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The financial event 
was not fully unknown for politicians and economists, given that past similar events 
where vastly studied by them and many theories were formulated on how to and what to 
do to reverse the situation. The crisis of 2007-2008 had a great impact on firms. The 
collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. marked the fall of the worlds’ financial system 
and managers, unlike politicians and theoretical economists, faced major changes on its’ 
firms’ environment almost instantaneously. 
Following the crisis economic shock on accounting matters, the research question of this 
study emerges from the intent to understand the impact on earnings management, in terms 
of direction and intensity, from free cash flow, dividend and leverage, through 
discretionary accruals. A second purpose of this study is to infer whether the financial 
crisis made extreme pressure on European, non-financial firms’ managers, leading them 
to alter the direction and/or intensity of its’ discretionary accruals. Summing, this study’ 
research questions are:  
RQ1: Does free cash flow impact earnings management? 
RQ2: Does leverage impact earnings management? 
RQ3: Do dividends impact on earnings management?  
Given the previous research questions, this study tests hypothesis that would allow to 
conclude what the connection between the stated accounting measures and EM is, and 
how to measure that relationship in terms of direction and proportion. 
Under RQ1 context, most of the existing literature indicates that free cash flow positively 
impacts EM, either through Discretionary accruals management (DAC) or/and Real 
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activities earnings management (REM), for normal economic periods of sample selection 
(Chung, Firth & Kim, 2005 and Labhane and Mahakud, 2016).The rationale behind the 
stated is that managers with excess FCF engage in non-profitable projects for its own 
welfare maximization, which would translate, on the following years, in a decrease on 
firms and shareholders welfare. Thus, managers use the surplus of free cash flow to 
camouflage bad investment decisions made on previous years. Some studies also found 
evidence that FCF could negatively impact earnings management (Dechow, Ge, Shcrand, 
2010 and Becker, Defond, Jiambalvo and Subramanyam, 1998). The argument is based 
on market and tax reasons, suggesting that managers could push towards decreasing 
earnings via cash flow to smooth earnings, and on the year of the “bad” investments, FCF 
reduces due to its’ actual investment cash outflow. Jensen (1986) posited that the excess 
of FCF generates agency costs that firms must undertake due to the possibility of its’ non-
optimal investment. Gul (2001) argued that firms with higher surplus of free cash flow 
would have more EM, especially when investment opportunities scarce. Thus, the first 
two hypotheses of this study arises: 
H1: Firms with high levels of free cash flow would have high levels of EM; 
H2: Firms with high levels of free cash flow manage earnings downwards; 
As stated, a great economic shock, such as a global financial crisis, has great impact on firms’ 
ability to generate earnings, and sets back its’ access to capital sources. A large bundle of 
studies indicate that earnings are the metric that most investors use to make investment 
decisions (Kothari, 2001). Dividend per-se, can be claimed as a proportion of firms’ earnings 
that would be distributed to its investors, meanings that dividends, theoretically, would vary 
with firms’ earnings. In reality, the previous doesn’t occur. Dividends have a signaling effect 
about firms’ future ability to perform (Farinha and Moreira, 2007). Several studies 
investigated the impact of dividend signaling effects on firms’ reported earnings and its’ 
dividend yields, concluding that managers are willing to practice an unsupportable dividend 
yield rate to maintain the dividend amount, because its’ reduction would mean a greater 
decrease on firms’ quotation. Therefore, dividend would be an enhancer of EM (Graham et 
al., 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006). 
On another hand, dividends can mitigate EM due to its’ cash flow dispersion ability (Guizani, 
2018). Assuming that the higher the free cash flow the higher the EM, the dividend 
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expropriate managers from excess cash, reducing EM (Jensen, 1986). From the previous 
arguments and under the second research question, the third and fourth hypothesis of this 
study arise: 
H3: Firms that pay dividends would have lower EM levels; 
H4: Firms that pay dividends manage earnings upwards; 
Under RQ3 and focusing on leverage, following the dividend rationale, debt generates an 
obligation to the firms to repay its’ coupons and principal, reducing the cash on managers 
“hands”. Additionally, indebtedness creates creditors scrutiny over firms’ books, working 
as a mitigator of EM practices (Rodriguez-Pérez and Van Hemman, 2010). Disregarding 
its mitigator component, leverage is also an enhancer, given that debt contracts are very 
rigorous, and its violation would harm the borrower considerably, in terms of pricing and 
accessibility to new funds (DeFond and Jiambalvo,1994; Chamberlain et al., 2014). Debt 
covenants are usually connected to firms accounting measures, such as earnings 
benchmarks and profitability and solvency ratios. Thus, managers are motivated to 
upward manage earnings through leverage. Then the fifth and sixth hypothesis of this 
study arise: 
H5: Firms with higher leverage have less earnings management; 
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4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Sample selection 
The data provider used to collect the financial and accounting information were Amadeus 
and DataStream. The data concerns to all listed Euro Zone (15) firms, except the financial 
and insurance, public administration and defense, extraterritorial organizations and 
bodies sectors, from NACE REV: 2 main sections classification. The exclusion of this 
main sections results from its’ accounts specific characteristics and regulation. Its’ 
inclusion would mean biased results on total accruals and consequently on discretionary 
accruals measures. 
Additionally, firms with insufficient data and firms which data violates the fundamental 
rules of accounting were excluded, and the number of observations by country were 
assured. To assure that outliers effects were suppressed, all observations with total 
accruals below 1 percentile and above 99 percentiles were excluded, resulting on 354 
exclusions.  






Austria 141 0,82% 
Belgium 147 0,85% 
Germany 3 236 18,74% 
Denmark 195 1,13% 
Spain 588 3,41% 
Finland 498 2,88% 
France 3 353 19,42% 
United Kingdom 4 791 27,75% 
Grece 1 067 6,18% 
Ireland 206 1,19% 
Italy 1 185 6,86% 
Luxembourg 66 0,38% 
Netherlands 56 0,32% 
Portugal 106 0,61% 
Sweden 1 631 9,45% 
Total 17 266 100% 
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The study period referred to 2009 to 2016. However, the data was collected from 2008 to 
2016. The final sample has 17.266 observations, from 15 Euro-Zone countries and 17 
different industries.  






A. Agriculture, forestry and fishing 74 0,43% 
B. Mining and quarrying 483 2,80% 
C. Manufacturing 4 185 24,24% 
D. Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 267 1,55% 
E. Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 142 0,82% 
F. Construction 693 4,01% 
G. Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 1 722 9,97% 
H. Transportation and storage 492 2,85% 
I. Accommodation and food service activities 269 1,56% 
J. Information and communication 2 216 12,83% 
L. Real estate activities 748 4,33% 
M. Professional, scientific and technical activities 4 741 27,46% 
N. Administrative and support service activities 725 4,20% 
P. Education 44 0,25% 
Q. Human health and social work activities 131 0,76% 
R. Arts, entertainment and recreation 257 1,49% 
S. Other service activities 77 0,45% 
Total 17 266 100% 
 
4.2. Measurement of variables 
Several models and its’ extensions have been used to measure earnings management. 
Total accruals value contemplates a non-discretionary part, which refers to “normal” or 
“regular” accruals, which vary amongst country, industry and firms’ life cycle stage and, 
a discretionary part that is associated with managers’ earnings management 
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actions/decisions. Academics widely use the abnormal or discretionary accruals as a 
proxy to earnings management.  
 This study uses Kothari et al. (2005) to estimate the total accruals value. The model 
assumes the error term (𝜀𝑖𝑡) of an Ordinary Least Square as discretionary accruals, 
translating the earnings management into a figure (number). Adding to this, Dechow et 
al. (1995) extension to Jones (1991) model is used to compute discretionary accruals and 
finally, Kasznik (1999) extended Dechow et al. (1995) and Jones (1991) models 
“including the change in operating cash flow as an explanatory variable” and adjusted 
“the sales revenue variable for the change in accounts receivable” (Kasznik 1999, p.64). 
The combination between Kothari et al. (2005) and the two previous models grants 
robustness to the analysis and extends the literature on model selection to measure 
discretionary accruals.  
Equation 1. shows Kothari et al. (2005) estimation of total accruals: 
(1) 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = (









)   
As posited, the components of total accruals are reflected on Eq. (1). The discretionary 
accruals are estimated by subtracting from total accruals its’ non-discretionary part. All 
variables on Eq. (1) have lagged total assets as denominator, which works mathematically 
and simultaneously as a control mechanism for scale bias and as a mitigator of 
heteroscedasticity in residuals, following Kothari et al. (2005). On this model 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 or 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 are included, since the model was developed to provide an effective reflection 




=  𝛽0 +   𝛽1(
 1
𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽2 (
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽4(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
Where: 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡: total accruals of firm i on year t; 𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1: total assets if firm i on year t-1; 
∆𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is the change in sales/revenues between year t and t-1 of firm i; 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is net 
property, plant and equipment of firm i on year t; 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 𝑜𝑟 (𝑖,𝑡−1) is the return on assets 
of firm i on years t or t-1 and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡is the residual term from the regression, furtherly denoted 
as discretionary accrual (DAC). 
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Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) extended Jones (1991) model. Jones (1991) assumed 
that managers do not exercise discretion over revenues in either the estimation period or 
the event period. Thus, Dechow et al. (1995) adjusted the revenue component for the 
change in receivable in the event period. 
Dechow et al. (1995) model: 
(3) 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (
 1
𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1






) + 𝛽3 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
Where: 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡: total accruals of firm i on year t; 𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1: total assets of firm i on year t-1; 
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is the change in sales/revenues between year t and t-1 of firm i; ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is the 
change in receivables between year t and t-1 of firm i; 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is net property, plant and 
equipment of firm i on year t and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡is the DAC. 
The adjustment should ensure that the estimate of earnings management is no longer 
biased towards zero Jones (1991). 
Kasznik (1999) extended Dechow et al. (1995) and Jones (1991) by taking the 
modification made by Dechow et al. (1995) on Jones (1991) model and introducing the 
change in cash flow from operations (Eq.5)  






) + 𝛽2 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 (
∆𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
Where: 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡: total accruals of firm i on year t; 𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1: total assets of firm i on year t-1; 
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is the change in sales/revenues between year t and t-1 of firm i; ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is the 
change in receivables between year t and t-1 of firm i; 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is net property, plant and 
equipment of firm i on year t; ∆𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 is the change in cash flow from operations between 
year t and t-1 of firm i and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡is the DAC. 
The regressions unstandardized residuals were saved as DAC_”model” (discretionary 
accruals), being the measure of earnings management. DAC variables measure the 
direction of earnings management, meaning that a negative sign means that managers 
used DAC to decrease earnings and, consequently, if it’s positive they use it to increase 
its’ firms’ earnings.  
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Furtherly, ABS_DAC_”model” is computed as the absolute value of any DAC_”model” 
variable. The previous measures earnings management as an amount regardless the 
direction (practice more or less of earnings management). Hence, for each model, two 
measures of discretionary accruals were computed, becoming then possible to infer the 
direction and amount of EM of each observation, to perform the analysis. 
For this study proposes, DAC_”model” and ABS_DAC_”model” are assumed, furtherly, 
as a dependent variables. The independent variables are free cash flow (FCF) which is 
the ratio of cash flow divided by total assets, leverage (LEV) which is the ratio of total 
debt over total assets and a binary variable which assumes the value of 1 if a firm pays 
dividends, and the value of 0 otherwise (BDY). The control variables are the return on 
assets (ROA), controlling for performances on the event period and business cycle stage 
differences and, the natural log of total assets (LN(AT)) controlling for size differences. 
 
4.3. Research method 
The main purpose of this study is to analyze the link between the levels of earnings 
management with respect to cash flow, leverage and dividend. Additionally, the 
incorporation of the crisis factor on the analyses aims to identify if the crisis affected the 
usual levels of DAC. 
It uses a standard regression analysis and descriptive statistics as tools, SPSS statistical 
packages were used to conduct all the analysis. Total accruals were calculated based on 
Kothari et al., (2005) model presented on Eq.1. To test the research hypothesis previously 
formulated, the following multivariate model were design: 
(5) 𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2(𝐵𝐷𝑌𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3(𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝐵𝑌𝑖,𝑡) +
𝛽5(𝐵𝐶𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽6(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽7(ln 𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where i refers to each firm observation and t to the matching year. 
The DAC variable was calculated using three models, Kothari et al. (2005), Dechow et 
al. (1995), Krasnik (1999). It measures discretionary accruals, and can be interpreted as 
a direction of earnings management, if positive means that earnings management goal is 
to inflate earnings, if negative the goal is to deflate it. Furtherly, the absolute value of 
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DAC is also computed to analyze EM in terms of its quantity/volume, meaning that higher 
values mean more EM, and lower values means less EM. Both DAC and ABS_DAC are 
dependent variables on this study, to test for all the hypothesis. The three models were 
used to confer sturdiness and comparison measure to the study. 
As independent variables this study counts firstly with FCF which measures the amount 
of free cash flow generated by the firm on a certain year and is computed by the ratio of 
free cash flow by total assets. The second independent variable of interest is a binary 
which assumes the value 1 if a firm pay dividends and 0 if it doesn’t. The third 
independent variable is leverage which is measured by the ratio of total debt by total 
assets. 
To access differences on firms, four control variables were added to the model: BY, BC, 
ROA and ln(AT). The variables BY and BC are dummies to control for year and country, 
respectively. ROA is widely used on the previous literature to analyze the relationship 
between operating revenues and the earnings management practices (Santos, 2017 and 
Tendeloo & Vanstraelen, 2008). Ln(AT) is computed by the natural log of total assets to 
control for size differences. 
 
5. RESULTS 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
According to Table III., for Kothari et al. (2005), Dechow et al. (1995) and Krasnik 
(1999), the calculated measures of DAC, verify that the average discretionary accruals 
level is negative but close to zero, for Europe 15 zone listed companies, meaning that, on 
average, companies’ managers deflate the results rather than inflate it. In terms of amount 
(“quantity”) all three measures indicate an approximate level of EM, which is a “red flag” 
enhancing the fact that all measures are possibly highly correlated. 
Regarding the independent variables of the model, it’s important to refer that, on average, 
FCF represents about 4.5% of total assets, LEV accounts for 21.2% of total assets, and 
that 57.04% of the sample firms pay dividends, which confers sturdiness to the analysis. 
Additionally, the variable used for control in a crisis period (B_CRS) has an average of 
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0.5960, which means that 59.6% of the observations depicted on the sample rely on the 
crisis period. 
 
Table III - Descriptive statistics 
 
 
The ROA control variable average is negative, which is not usual on the literature, but 
reflects the latest financial crisis. Its median is positive, and its maximum is relatively 
low when compared with its minimum, which could mean that either the majority of the 





Variables: DAC_KOTH discretionary accruals computed using Kothari et al. (2005) model; ABS_DAC_KOTH absolute 
value of DAC_KOTH; DAC_DECH discretionary accruals computed using Dechow et al. (1995) model; ABS_DAC_DECH 
absolute value of DAC_DECH; DAC_KRAS discretionary accruals computed using Krasnik (1999) model; 
ABS_DAC_KRAS absolute value of DAC_KRAS; FCF free cash flow; BDY binary variable where 1 dividend yield >0 and 
0, otherwise; LEV leverage; LN(AT) logarithm of total assets; ROA return on assets; CRS binary variable were 
1=[2009;2013] and 0=[2014;2016]; 
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5.2. Pearson’s correlation matrix 
Pearson’s correlation matrix assures that the measures computed do not have 
multicollinearity problems, and allows one to infer about the relationship between the 
measures.  
By analyzing the matrix (Table IV), it’s observable that all measures of DAC variables 
are highly correlated amongst each other, meaning that the application of the research 
model to any of these measures would lead to significant conclusions. For that reason, 
furtherly, only Kothari et al. (2005) model will be used to perform the analysis.  
The dependent variable of the research model (DAC) is negatively and significantly 
correlated with FCF, and positively and significantly correlated with BDY and LEV. 
These correlations are supported by previous literature, which is stated on the literature 
review chapter (chapter II).  
Additionally, the connection between the interest variables of the study is relatively low, 
lying in and absolute range of 0.055 and 0.284, thus multicollinearity is not a major 
problem in interpreting coefficients (Judge et al., 1988). 
ROA is highly positively correlated with FCF. This connection means that as firms’ 
revenues increase (or decrease), FCF also increase (or decrease), ceteris paribus, meaning 
that the amount of cash a business can generate is connected positively with its’ assets, 
which leads to the conclusion that the better the sample firms perform (higher ROA), the 
more cash they generate (higher FCF).  
Lastly, the correlation between ABS_DAC and ROA is negative, thus firms with higher 
operational earnings enroll in less EM, as supported by Tendeloo & Vanstraelen (2008) 
and Santos (2017).




Table IV - Pearsons’ correlation matrix 
 
Variables: DAC_KOTH discretionary accruals computed using Kothari et al. (2005) model; ABS_DAC_KOTH absolute value of DAC_KOTH; DAC_DECH discretionary 
accruals computed using Dechow et al. (1995)) model; ABS_DAC_DECH absolute value of DAC_DECH; DAC_KRAS discretionary accruals computed using Krasnik (1999) 
model; ABS_DAC_KRAS absolute value of DAC_KRAS;FCF free cash flow; BDY binary variable were 1=dividend yield >0 and 0=dividend yield=0; LEV leverage; LN(AT) 
logarithm of total assets; ROA return on assets; 
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5.3. The impact of the free cash flow, dividend and leverage to 
earnings management 
5.3.1. Effect in terms of direction 
The result of the multivariate model (OLS) presented below on Table V. allow to take 
conclusions about the impact of the interest variables over EM in terms of its’ direction.  
The association between the independent variables FCF and DAC, shows a negative beta 
coefficient, statistically significant at 1%, in all model specifications, validating the 
second hypothesis of this study. This translates that managers of firms with higher levels 
of free cash flow manage earnings with the intent to its’ reduction. These findings are in 
line with the hypothesis of smoothing earnings stated by Beker et al., (1998) and Dechow 
et al., (2010) and the hypothesis proposed by Jensen (1986) that states that managers in 
firms with higher levels of free cash flow tend to use its’ cash to invest in non-profitable 
projects linked to their own welfare.  
The second variable of interest is a binary variable with respect to dividend payment. Its 
beta coefficient is positive and statistically significant at 1% on every models’ 
specifications, indicating that firms that pay dividends manage earnings upwards, which 
is supported by the literature (Roychowdhury, 2006 and Graham et al., 2005) inferring 
that these companies suffer from market pressure to meet dividend thresholds or inflate 
earnings to justify a certain payout policy. The result validates the forth hypothesis of this 
study. 
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Table V - Kothari (2005) regression model results (DAC) 
 
Variables: FCF free cash flow; BDY binary variable were 1=dividend yield >0 and 0=dividend yield=0; LEV 
leverage; LN(AT) logarithm of total assets; ROA return on assets; 
 
The outcomes for leverage show that its’ relationship with DAC is positive and 
statistically significant at 1% significance for all scenarios. This result validates the sixth 
hypothesis, implying that leverage pressures firms’ management to fulfill debt covenants, 
when its’ violation is probable or to take advantage on renegotiating terms. Thus, firms 
with higher levels of leverage tend to manage earnings upwards (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 
1994 and Chamberlain et al., 2014). 
Concerning the control variables, the log of total assets shows a negative sign for all cases 
but it’s not statistically significant. The return on assets control variable has a positive 
effect on DAC, and it is always statically significant at 1% significance. However, in this 
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study ROA serves the purpose of controlling a firm’s profitability divergences, and its 
effects could be interpreted as that firms with higher ROA manage earnings upwards. 
 
5.3.2. Effect in terms of intensity 
Table VI. argues that the results of the multivariate use the previously estimated absolute 
value of DAC model as dependent variable. Its results provide understanding about 
earnings management as a “quantity” regardless of its’ direction. 
According to the table, and regarding the variables of interest, FCF presents a positive 
sign, and is statistically significant at 1% significance for all cases. This result means that 
the higher the free cash flow available the more EM it practices (Jensen, 1986 and Chung, 
Firth & Kim, 2005 and Labhane and Mahakud, 2016). Indicating that managers are more 
willing to “waste” their firms’ cash when more cash is generated. The result validates the 
first hypothesis of this study. 
The dividend variable presents a significant (1%) negative sign, for all model 
specifications, which implies that firms that pay dividends enroll in less earnings 
management. The signaling effect of the dividend could lead to a high level of scrutiny 
over paying dividends firms, which could mitigate EM. Other plausible effects lie on the 
moral hazard risk faced by firms connected to an EM situation. This could back fire to 
the firm, representing a great loss of credibility on the market, which could, consequently, 
drive the quotation down. In addition, paying dividends reduces the available cash on 
managers hands, mitigating EM (Jensen, 1986 and Guizani, 2018). 
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Table VI - Kothari (2005) regression model results (ABS_DAC) 
 
Variables: FCF free cash flow; BDY binary variable were 1=dividend yield >0 and 0=dividend yield=0; LEV 
leverage; LN(AT) logarithm of total assets; ROA return on assets; 
 
On the leverage side, the negative significant coefficient indicates that firms with higher 
levels of leverage tend to enroll in less EM. Similarly, to the dividend variable effects, 
increasing the leverage weight on a firm’s capital structure would imply a greater scrutiny 
from debt providers and a reduction on FCF, which mitigates EM (Jensen, 1986; 
Rodriguez-Pérez and Van Hemman, 2010; Afza and Rashid, 2014; Jelinek, 2007). 
The control variables (LN(AT) and ROA), present a negative and statistically significant 
(1%) relationship with ABS_DAC, meaning that the higher the firms’ asset level is, less 
EM it practices and that the higher the ROA the less EM it practices, respectively.  
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5.3.3. Robustness analysis  
In order to confer robustness on the previous results, two subsamples were created. The 
DAC variable previously used to conduct the directional analyses on EM, were divided 
into only positive (negative) subsamples. The multivariate model presented on Eq. 5 was 
applied onto each subsample. The rationale behind the process is to access if the interest 
variables effects changes within firms’ that inflate (deflate) earnings. 
Secondly, in order to access the crises effect of the interest variables on EM and to confer 
robustness to the first results, a binary variable (B_CRS) was introduced on the 
multivariate model presented on Eq. 5 and, the sample was divided into two subsamples: 
crisis period covering from 2009 to 2013 (European commission report 2014) and post-
crisis period, covering from 2014 to 2016. 
The multivariate model used was the same (Kothari et al., 2005), and for positive DAC 
estimated values, the free cash flow effect keeps constant with the previous analysis. The 
effect is negative and statistically significant at 1% significance for all model 
specifications, meaning that amongst the firms that inflate earnings, firms with higher 
level of FCF inflate to lower amounts. Hence, firms with higher FCF, amongst inflating 
earnings firm, manage earnings to less positive values. The dividend presents a negative 
statistically significant (1%) beta. The results indicate that amongst the firms with 
positive DAC, dividend paying firms have less DAC, which means that these firms inflate 
earnings, but in less quantity than if they do not pay dividends. This effect is once again 
connected with market scrutiny and reputational factors of listed firms. On the leverage 
side, the relationship is statistically significant (10%) for (1) and (3) model specifications 
while is not statistically significant for (2) and (4). The beta coefficient is positive, 
indicating that amongst the firms that inflate earnings, higher levels of debt conduct to 
more inflate earnings. However, it’s not possible to take any conclusion from the result, 
due to insufficient statistically significance, the results support the previous conclusions 
(Table VII). 
Keeping everything else constant, the model was applied to negative estimated DAC only. 
The results for FCF are negative and statistically significant (1%). This means that for 
firms that deflate earnings, high levels of FCF drive reported earnings to even lower 
values. The conclusion confirming again the second hypothesis of the study. In dividend 
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paying terms, the overall effect is that amongst the firms with negative DAC, dividend 
paying firms tend to increase earnings. This outcome is supported by the signaling effect 
of the dividend and by the smoothing earnings theory (Allen and Michaely, 2003; Brav 
et al., 2005). The same effect occurs with leverage, as firms with high leverage amongst 
the negative DAC firms push earnings to fewer negative values.  
Table VII. - Regression results for negative and positive DAC 
 
To study the crisis economic shock, a crisis binary variable was added to the model. It 
assumed the value of 1 when the observation lied on the crisis period (2009 – 2013) and 
0 otherwise. The purpose was to provide understanding on how the crises affected the 
interest variables impact on EM.  In term of direction, the results corroborate with the 
previous analysis (Table VIII), meaning that during the crisis period the firms behaved as 
usual, showing a negative significant (1%) beta for FCF, and positive significant (1%) 
betas for BDY and LEV. The crisis variable presents a negative value, significant at 10% 
significance, meaning that during crises firms intended to drive earnings to lower levels 
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through DAC. In terms of quantity of EM, the effect of each variable was not affected, 
and the crisis binary presents a positive and statistically significant at 1% significance 
coefficient, meaning that during crisis, firms enroll in more EM. These effects can be 
explained by the attempt to hide lower performances, or by the fact that lower 
performances were expected, which could lead managers to intentionally decrease 
reported earnings. 
Table VIII. - Regression results including the impact of the financial crisis 
 
Finally, the sample was divided basing on non-crisis period and crisis period. The first 
subsample counts 10.290 observations and the second 6.976 observations. The purpose 
of the division is to confirm the results of the crisis binary, and again to access the crisis 
effect on the interest variables with respect to EM. In directional terms, the overall effect 
of the variables is constant and corroborates the previous results. The subsample method 
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allows one to compare the regression coefficients. Thus, it’s observable that, for both 
periods, the FCF is significant at 1% significance, and has a higher coefficient on the 
post-crisis subsample. This leads to the conclusion that during the crisis the FCF impact 
on DAC was negative but less pronounced than after crisis. On dividend and leverage 
terms, both experienced a reduction on coefficient and significance when moving from a 
during crisis to a post-crisis period, which means that during the crisis, firms’ 
management gave much more attention to these two measures than after the crisis.  
6. CONCLUSION 
The Great Recession was the largest economic and financial crisis since the Great 
Depression (1929-1939). Although some countries and industries have already recovered 
from its’ initial global effects, some are still experiencing its’ consequences as if it 
occurred less than 1 year ago. These effects have been examined by several studies on 
accounting matters, either in terms of effects over firms’ books or in terms of markets’ 
reaction over firms’ disclosures (Gaio, 2010; Santos, 2017) 
This study is not different from the referred. Its’ first goal was to understand the 
connection between the quantity of free cash flow and leverage, and the payment of 
dividends of European state member firms and its practice of earnings management. For 
this purpose, the study uses a sample of around 2.150 firm-year observations, of Euro-
zone listed companies, from 2009 to 2016, containing a total of 17.266 observations. 
Subsequently, the sample is divided to analyse the impact of the great recession on firms’ 
earnings management engagements.  
The results indicate that, for these specific sample characteristics, the relationship 
between the FCF and EM is negative in terms of its’ direction and positive in terms of 
its’ quantity, meaning that managers of firms with more cash, manage firms’ earnings 
with the intent to its reduction (Kadioglu and Yimaz, 2017) and, simultaneously that, in 
the same conditions, more FCF leads to more EM (Chung et al., 2005; Lanhane and 
Mahakud, 2016; Jensen, 1986). Further analysis was conducted to corroborate the first 
conclusions, and the results support the first conclusions, meaning that regardless of the 
firms overall EM goal, more FCF leads managers to deflate earnings.  
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Opposingly, the link between LEV and BDY, and EM is positive regarding its’ direction 
and negative regarding its’ quantity, meaning that managers in firms that pay dividends 
or firms with more leverage inflate earnings confirming Graham et al. (2005), 
Roychowdhury (2006), DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Chamberlain et al. (2014), and 
that in the previous situation they enroll in less EM (Jensen, 1986 and Guizani, 2018 and 
Rodriguez-Pérez and Van Hemman, 2010; Afza andRashid, 2014; Jelinek, 2007). A 
deeper analysis indicates that for dividend paying firms this connection could be 
characterized as a smoothing earnings practice, since for these firms the role of dividends 
is inversible related with the EM intention. The same analyses on LEV indicates that 
independently of the EM goal, high levels of leverage conducts to increase reported 
earnings, supporting the hypothesis from DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Chamberlain 
et al. (2014). 
The introduction of a crisis scenario on this study, leads to the conclusion that during its’ 
period, firms’ managed earnings to inflate them, but lesser than on crisis off period, and 
that firms’ practices more EM during crisis than on off crisis periods. The analysis also 
indicates that the overall relationship of each of the interest variables did not change in 
sign terms although it has changed it terms of proportions. This crisis’ effect on EM can 
be justified by the firms relieve of market pressure to disclose “good” results, since it’s 
expectable that they should be “bad”, and by the theory of delaying “good” news when 
they are not expected.  
The main limitation of this study is the fact that we assumed to be a non-crisis period is a 
period whether most countries and industries are still recovering from one of the biggest 
economic shocks that ever occurred, the great recession. Other limitations emerge from 
the measure of EM. Additionally, EM can assume several forms and, it’s a very subjective 
concept that becomes hard to measure (Leuz et al., 2003).  
For future investigation, a similar study using another measure of EM, such as other 
models to compute its proxy or a focus on REM instead of AEM is recommended. 
Another study could go through the application of this same methodology to other 
geographic areas or non-listed firms, or to firms in the financial and public sectors, with 
the necessary adjustments. Lastly, a study that covers the time frame limitation of this 
study, using a more distant data for post-crisis period is suggested. 
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Table IX – Results of the regression models to a subset of during crisis period (Year=[2009;2013]) 
  DAC_KOTH ABS_DAC_KOTH 














































































 (4,0767) (3,5218) (3,7774) (3,2619) -(0,8029) -(1,9790) -(1,2149) -(2,4540) 














































Yes Yes No No  Yes Yes No No  
Variable 
Country 
Yes No Yes No  Yes No Yes No  
Observati
ons 
10 290 10 290 10 290 10 290 10 290 10 290 10 290 10 290 
R-squared 0,1130 0,1110 0,1090 0,1070 0,1340 0,1250 0,1150 0,1060 
F-Test 57,0650 142,5790 66,3330 246,1370 68,8530 163,3710 70,2850 244,9460 
P-value 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
*, ** and *** indicates the statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The t-test 
statistic is on brackets. 
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Table X – Results of the regression models to a subset of post-crisis period (Year=]2009;2016] 
  DAC_KOTH ABS_DAC_KOTH 




































 -(34,4633) -(35,2582) -(34,4949) -(35,2883) (16,2961) (16,8000) (16,3186) (16,8205) 









 (1,7886) (1,5545) (1,7993) (1,5672) -(10,2953) -(9,6645) -(10,2942) -(9,6637) 






 (0,9375) (1,0635) (0,9345) (1,0564) -(1,5962) -(3,4365) -(1,6010) -(3,4347) 



























 (32,3312) (33,1429) (32,3686) (33,1786) -(17,6008) -(18,2494) -(17,6224) -(18,2683) 
Variable 
Year 
Yes Yes No No  Yes Yes No No  
Variable 
Country 
Yes No Yes No  Yes No Yes No  
Observati
ons 
6 976 6 976 6 976 6 976 6 976 6 976 6 976 6 976 
R-
squared 













P-value 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
*, ** and *** indicates the statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The 
t-test statistic is on brackets. 
1, 2, 3 and 4 - Pooled OLS. 
 
